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THE MUTUAL AID PACT OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
VERNON M. BRIGS, JR.
ON OCTOBER 30, 1958, representativesof six of the nation's twelve domes-
tic trunk-line carriers and one inter-
national carrier signed an agreement,
effective retroactively to Octoher 20,1958,
estahlishing a program for the partial
protection of struck participants against
the normal economic losses associated
with a strike period.^ The plan is known
as the "Mutual Aid Pact." The original
six carrier signatories^ and the four other
trunk-line carriers^ who later joined the
pact usually account for approximately
90 percent of the annual trunk-line traffic
carried in the nation.*
Under the provisions of Section 412 (b)
of the Federal Aviation Act,^  carriers are
obligated to present such agreements to
the Civil Aei'onautics Board (CAB) for
review. The CAB, in turn, is required to
rule as to whether or not the objectives
of such agreements are adverse to the
"public interest."* On May 20, 1959, the
CAB, in a four to one vote, extended its
Multiemployer unionism poses difficult prob-
lems of bargaining strategy for employers exposed
to the hazards of the "whipsaw" or divide-and-
conquer tactic used by some unions. This circum-
stance has resulted in employer experimentation
with various mutual assistance arrangements.
One such scheme, the Mutual Aid Pact worked
out by a number of carriers in the airline indus-
try, is described in this article.
The author is assistant professor of economics
at the University of Texas. He wishes to express
his indebtedness to Charles C. Killingsworth for
his detailed comments on an earlier version of
this article.—EDITOR
approval to the pact subject to the dele-
tion of a single clause that required a
struck carrier to refer its customers to the
available flights of other pact partici-
pants. This original approval, however,
was granted by the CAB without the
benefit of an evidentiary investigation.
Within a year after the initial CAB
ruling, the coverage conditions of the
pact were broadened with the result that
four other carriers joined the original six
as participants. The combination of the
enlarged scope of the agreement, the ex-
tended application of its membership,
and the filing of a detailed list of objec-
tions by six of the major labor unions in
the industry led the CAB to reconsider
its earlier passive position. On June 20,
1960, the CAB ordered a thorough in-
vestigation. A long and detailed record
was developed over the following four-
year period. On July 10, 1964, the CAB
S^ee "Joint Exhibits of the Airline Parties,"
vol. I, CA.B. Docket 9977 (March 31, 1962), Joint
Exhibit No. 1, pp. 1-6, for a detailed account of
the fifteen days immediately preceding the sign-
ing of the pact.
"American Airlines, Inc., Capital Airlines, Inc.,
Eastern Airlines, Inc., Pan American World Air-
lines, Inc., Trans World Airlines Inc., and United
Air Lines, Inc.
"BranifE Airways, Inc., Continental Air Lines,
Inc., National Airlines Inc. (National no longer
is a member), and Northwest Airlines, Inc.
'Civil Aeronautics Board Order No. E-15413,
p. 3.
"49 U.S.C. 1382.
°49 U.S.C. 1302.
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— in a split vote of three in favor, one
opposed, and one in favor in part and
opposed in part — granted approval to
the pact for a limited three-year period.
Labor Relations in the Industry
Before discussing the Mutual Aid Pact
itself, it is important to comment hriefly
upon the general nature of lahor rela-
tions in the industry. Unquestionably,
the dominant feature of virtually every
aspect of this industry is the degree of
direct and indirect involvement of the
federal government.^ The beginning of
public regulation of industrial relations
in the airline industry dates back to 1936
when Title II was added as an amend-
ment to the Railway Labor Act. The
amendment^ extended virtually all of the
provisions applicable to railway labor
relations under Title I of that act to the
airline industry. Later, in 1938, the Civil
Aeronautics Act* was passed, which re-
quired that any carrier desiring to secure
and to retain a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the CAB must comply
with Title II of the Railway Labor Act.^ o
The application of the Railway Labor
Act to labor negotiation in the industry
has meant that a detailed apparatus for
seeking to minimize the likelihood of an
actual strike has been superimposed upon
the bargaining situation. The bargaining
participants are required to progress
through a series of prescribed steps —
each of which is designed to enhance the
opportunity for a settlement at that stage.
These steps include obligatory confer-
ences between the parties; mediation
attempts through the auspices of the
National Mediation Board (NMB); use
'Mark L. Kahn, "Regulatory Agencies and In-
dustrial Relations: The Airlines Case," American
Economic Review, May 1952, pp. 686-698.
M9 Stat. 1189.
"52 Stat. 977.
>°52 Stat. 990.
of bipartisan systems boards of adjust-
ments— which, if deadlocked, may em-
ploy a neutral referee—to proffer binding
settlements of unresolved grievances and
disputes rising out of the interpretation
of the terms of existing contracts; volun-
tary arbitration of issues pertaining to
new contract terms; and the establish-
ment of presidential emergency boards to
ascertain the exact questions in dispute
and, generally, to tender recommenda-
tions for terms of settlement.
Labor-management relations have de-
veloped against this backdrop. The first
major union in the airline industry was
the Air Line Pilots Association, formed
in 1931, but trade unionism did not come
in the non-pilot occupations until the
early forties. Following the war, the rapid
growth of the industry was accompanied
by intensive unionization of all categories
except the white-collar occupations. Cur-
rently, there are nine national unions
that represent the major job classifica-
tions that bargain with the eleven domes-
tic trunk lines^^ and one international
carrier.i2 Most carriers also bargain with
several other minor unions representing
various occupational groups. Hence, mul-
tiple unionism is a key feature of the
bargaining environment.
Multiple unionism has been a constant
source of industrial instability.^* Aside
from encouraging interunion competi-
tion over bargaining accomplishments
and objectives, the primary disruptive
feature associated with multiple union-
"The number of domestic trunk-lines was re-
duced to eleven on June 1, 1961, when Capital
merged with United.
"For a listing of the certified employee repre-
sentatives for each occupation on each individual
carrier, see Twenty-ninth Annuat Report of the
National Mediation Board (Washington: G.P.O.,
1963), p. 94.
"See Edward B. Shils, "Transportation's Labor
Crisis," Harvard Business Review, May 1964, pp.
84-98.
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ism is that it greatly increases strike ex-
posure. The numerous contracts, negotia-
tion sessions, contract expiration dates,
strike threats, and jurisdictional contro-
versies all contribute to the increased
possibility that an actual strike will
occur, and in most instances, a strike by
any one of the numerous unions can shut
down the entire operations of a firm. In
addition, the presence of rival unions at
the individual job level has tended to
compound these difficulties.
In almost every instance, collective bar-
gaining is conducted on a single-carrier
and single-union basis. The dissimilar
operating problems of the different car-
riers have been contributing factors in
this development. Differences in time
schedules, route patterns, and types of
equipment have given rise to unique
issues with each carrier.^* Another factor
has been the craft unionism that has
grown out of the Railway Labor Act,
under which a major function of the
National Mediation Board is to resolve
employee representation disputes. The
NMB is required, upon the request of
any party to such dispute, to designate
who is to participate in a certification
election. The standard relied upon by
the Board in making such decisions is the
so-called "majority rule provision" of the
act. Under this doctrine, "the majority
of any craft or class of employees shall
have the right to determine who shall be
the representative of the craft or class for
the purposes of the Act."^^ This repre-
sentation provision of the act was im-
posed upon the airline employees at a
time when the industry itself was in its
infancy. In virtually all other industries
in the nation — including the railroads
"Mark L. Kahn, "Mutual Strike Aid in the
Airline Industry," Papers Presented at the 1960
Spring Meeting of the Industriat Retations Re-
search Association, May 1960, p. 576.
"Title I, sec. 2, par. 4. Italics added.
— the pattern of union organization was
originally determined by the employees
themselves and by the inherent labor-
market characteristics of the particular
industry. In the airline industry, the
organizational pattern was decreed by
Congress. The continued reliance upon
the "craft or class" principle would seem
to guarantee that craft unionism rather
than industrial unionism will prevail as
the structural basis of union organiza-
tion.i* Since each craft has now developed
its own special problems and since several
unions are rivals for the same members,
the unions — with the exception of the
International Association of Machinists
(IAM) — have shown little interest in
multiunit bargaining.
Still another influence favoring indi-
vidual bargaining has been the interpre-
tations given to the Railway Labor Act
by the CAB. The Board has ruled that
multiunit bargaining "cannot be imposed
by any party to a dispute but must come
only as a result of the consent of all
parties." '^^  Since in most instances it is
to the advantage of one of the parties not
to favor enlargement of the bargaining
unit, it is usually impossible for both
parties to agree to bargain in any manner
other than on a single-union and single-
employer basis. Finally, there is the fact
that the Air Transport Association
(ATA), the industry trade association, is
quite weak in its duties and powers when
compared with associations in other large
industries. As a result, ATA has not
succeeded in providing any lasting en-
couragement to attempts to establish
industry-wide bargaining.
The rapid inroads made by advancing
technology have been a further source of
"E. B. McNatt, Labor Retations in the Air
Transport Industry 1947-57 (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1958), pp. 8 and 23.
"8 C.A.B. 354 (1947).
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industrial relations difficulties. While
certainly not peculiar to this industry
alone, the difficulties of bargaining in an
environment characterized by rapid tech-
nological change have been both numer-
ous and onerous. On the employee side,
some occupations have been created, such
as the flight engineers which first ap-
peared in 1948 with the introduction of
the DC-6 and the Constellation. In recent
years, however, jobs like the flight radio
officer and flight navigator have been
rendered virtually obsolete. Similarly, the
coming of the jet liners in 1958 has now
threatened to eliminate the flight engi-
neers.18 The pace and breadth of techno-
logical change in the industry has raised
complications for all bargaining units.
As for the employers, the jet age has
brought many managerial problems. The
switch to jet aircraft has meant extensive
capital investment, increased fixed costs,
rapid obsolescence of equipment, and —
for the first few years after the introduc-
tion of the larger and faster jets — un-
planned overcapacity. Thus, the need for
industrial peace in recent years has been
without precedent. The likelihood of its
being achieved, however, has never been
dimmer.
Finally, mention should be made of the
fact that airline service is extremely "time
sensitive." Business inventories cannot be
stockpiled prior to a strike or past orders
recouped following a strike. When the
service is demanded, it is needed at a
specific time. If one carrier is struck, then
the facilities of a competing trunk-line
are generally available on the major
revenue routes. Should there be no direct
competitor or should the competitor be
operating at full capacity, the customers
'^Albert A. Blum, "Fourth Man Out —Back-
ground of the Flight Engineer-Airline Pilot Con-
flict," Labor Law Journat, August 1962, pp. 649-
657.
of the struck line may switch to alternate
forms of transportation or permanently
cancel their plans. Consequently, air
transportation is one industry today in
which the strike weapon has retained its
full measure of economic potency to the
individual firm.
Establishment of the Original Pact
As with virtually every aspect of the
pact, even its origin has been the subject
of major controversy. The carriers
claimed that it was a spontaneous reac-
tion to the union use of a whipsaw tactic
in a strike against Capital Airlines begin-
ning October 17, 1958. Capital had been
one of six carriers that had been engaged
in a contract dispute with IAM. All six
carriers had been joint parties before a
single presidential emergency board
(Board No. 122) proceeding before the
strike.!® Capital accepted the recommen-
dations of the Board; IAM rejected them.
Capital, which was in serious financial
difficulties,^ '' was struck while all of its
competitors continued to operate (includ-
ing, of course, the five other carriers in-
volved in the dispute). Thus the carriers
have stated that "the Capital strike was
unquestionably the immediate event that
inspired the Mutual Aid agreement."^^
The union parties, on the other hand,
argued that the pact had many preced-
ents insofar as attempts at joint action by
"On only two previous occasions since the air-
line industry was brought under the Railway
Labor Act has more than one carrier been a
party in a proceeding before an emergency
board. They were Board No. 36 in 1946 and No.
108 in 1955.
^"Joint Exhibits of the Airline Parties," vol.
II, C.A.B. Docket No. 9977, Dec. 18, 1961, Joint
Exhibit A, p. 3. Testimony of Robert J. Wilson,
vice-president-personnel and properties of Capi-
tal Airlines.
'^ " Brief of the Carrier Parties to Examiner S.
Thomas Simon," CA.B. Docket No. 9977, p. 8;
also, see "Joint Exhibits...," vol. II, Joint Ex-
hibit A, p. 1.
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airline employers to counter union strike
actions were concerned.^* The union
parties contended that as far hack as 1947
the carriers had tried to establish group
bargaining when the Airline Negotiating
Conference was established and replaced
in 1950 by the Airline Personnel Rela-
tions Conference.23 In the months prior
to the actual adoption of the pact, several
other devices had been seriously studied.
An official of Trans World, which was
about to introduce its jet equipment and
was apprehensive about its effects on
labor relations, had been working "for a
long time" on a proposal which pertained
solely to Trans World, Pan American,
American, and Eastern. These four car-
riers were to be the first to use jet equip-
ment. The proposal was simply that the
operating competitors would pay over to
a struck carrier an amount equal to the
increased revenue received during the
strike period. The exact details were
never completed.
Another proposal was under study by
officials connected with ATA. Their plan
also centered upon those carriers which
were soon to adopt jet service and in-
volved the establishing of a "broad group
bargaining plan" which would seek to
avoid the possibility of a selective strike
against one carrier by forcing the union
to strike all of them. The strike against
the group would be forced by having the
^"Brief of the Union Parties to Hearing Ex-
aminer S. Thomas Simon in Opposition to Ap-
proval of Mutual Aid Pact," CAB. Docket No.
9977, Nov. 29, 1962, pp. 28-33.
'"The exact original purposes of these organ-
izations is quite "vague" {ibid., pp. 56-57, esp.
ns. 91 and 92). Both organizations have heen
virtually of no consequence as actual bargaining
entities. The Airline Negotiating Conference
went out of existence shortly after its formation
without ever assuming any significant role. The
Airline Personnel Relations Conference serves
today solely as a body for the gathering and dis-
seminating of statistical information relevant to
industrial relations matters.
Struck carrier lease its equipment to the
remaining carriers that were operating.
The pilots on the other lines would, in
all likelihood, refuse to fly the equipment
and the non-struck carriers would be free
either to discharge the pilots or to shut
down their operations due to the fact
that the pilots had breached the terms of
their contract.^^ In this manner, group
bargaining could be at tained. The
"group bargaining plan" was to be
merged, if possible, with a "mutual insur-
ance plan." A special company was to be
established by the interested carriers in
Nebraska and additional insurance cover-
age would be sought from Lloyds of
London.^* Thus, the unions claimed that
"the original Pact was in fact a step in
an overall program of strike insurance
and group bargaining by which the car-
riers were to exert increased pressure on
the unions."^"
Subsequently, the Hearing Examiner
concurred with the union position and
held that "the record is clear that the
mutual aid principle had been under con-
sideration by the major air carriers for at
least a year prior to the execution of the
original Pact."^'
Provisions
The operational principle upon which
the original pact was based can be stated
simply, but its actual mechanics are quite
complicated. In the event that a strike
occurred against one of the participating
carriers involving any one of the three
conditions for coverage, then:
.. .each party will pay over to the party
suffering the strike an amount equal to
its increased revenues attributable to the
''"Brief of Union Parties.. .Examiner," pp.
29-30; also see "Initial Decision of Hearing
Examiner S. Thomas Simon," C.A.B. Dockett No.
9977 (May 14, 1963), p. 58, esp. n. 96.
=»"Brief of Union Parties...," p. 30.
'^Ibid., p. 34.
""Initial Decision.. .Examiner...," p. 55.
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strike during the term thereof, less appli-
cable added direct expense.2®
These payments have subsequently
been referred to as "windfall payments."
The three conditions which brought
the strike within the scope of the original
pact were:
1. A strike called to enforce union de-
mands in excess of or opposed to the
recommendations of a presidential emer-
gency board appointed under Section 10
of the Railway Labor Act.
2. A strike called before exhaustion of
the prestrike procedures of the Railway
Labor Act.
3. A strike which is "otherwise unlaw-
ful."29
In an earlier draft of the original ver-
sion, an official from Trans World sug-
gested two other situations which would
have made the pact applicable.^" These
were strikes for the purpose of compelling
the employment of personnel — (1) in
excess of the number required by govem-
ment regulations, and (2) with training
in skills not required or with greater
qualifications than those required by the
regulations. These two provisions were
removed from the final version of the
original draft "so that the agreement
would be confined to the principal objec-
tives of strengthening the procedures of
the Railway Labor Act.''^ ^
Under the original pact, the exact pro-
cedure for computing the amount of the
windfall payment was determined indi-
vidually by each of the carriers. Thus,
each carrier devised its own definitions
and its own computation formula. It is
important to note that under the wind-
fall payments provisions, the amount to
'^Agreement Dated October 20, 1958, C.A.B.
Docket 9977, p. 3.
''Ibid., pp. 2-3.
*'"Joint Exhibits of the Airline Parties," vol. I,
C.A.B. Docket No. 9977, Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 4.
id., p. 5.
be turned over to the struck competitor
is determined by the paying carrier.
Management's Objectives and Labor's Reaction
The carrier members have contended
from the beginning that the pact is a
"defensive weapon" which is needed to
correct an alleged "imbalance" in bar-
gaining power in favor of the unions.^^
Essentially, the explicit carrier arguments
are that the airline unions have misused
their right to strike; that the airline
unions have developed a multitude of
collective arrangements for interunion
and intraunion cooperation and concert-
ed action; and that the loss of good will,
the high poststrike costs associated with
resuming normal operations, and the
high fixed costs that cannot be reduced
in times of shutdowns make the economic
burden of a strike against a single carrier
extremely severe. Also implicit in the
early considerations of the pact was the
fear that the introduction of the new and
expensive jet aircraft would cause unrest
among the unions.
When the pact became public, the air-
line unions bitterly assailed every aspect
of it.^ * A tangible indication of the ap-
prehension felt by the unions was their
announcement in September 1959 of the
proposed formation of their own mutual
alliance. Subsequently, on April 12, 1960,
seven airline unions^* joined together to
'"E. g., see "Brief to the Civil Aeronautics
Board," C.A.B. Docket No. 9977, Jan. 5, 1959,
pp. 44ff.
'"See letters from Mr. James F. Horst, vice-
president of the Transport Workers Union (Nov.
5, 1959), Mr. George R. Petty, Jr., president of
Flight Engineers Association (Nov. 4, 1959), and
"Objections of International Association of Ma-
chinist" (Nov. 14, 1959) to the Civil Aeronautics
Board, contained in C.A.B. Docket No. 9977.
'^The Air Line Pilots Association, the Air Dis-
patchers Association, the Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks, the Flight Engineers In-
ternational Association, the Transport Workers
Union, the International Association of Machin-
ists, and the United Automobile Workers.
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form the Association of Air Transport
Unions (AATU). It was the avowed pur-
pose of this organization to seek a com-
mon contract expiration date for their
bargaining units and to oppose the con-
tinuation of the Mutual Aid Pact by
petitioning the CAB for a review of the
plan. The fact that such rivals as ALPA
and FEIA, and also IAM and TWU,
would unite into this single body is but
further proof of the dangers that the
unions saw in the pact. Yet, despite the
motivating fears that drove the unions
together, their lack of unity in the past
soon proved to be an insurmountable
obstacle. As a result, the AATU had be-
come inactive by November 1960.
The Coverage Problem
Almost immediately after the adoption
and implementation of the original pact,
the carriers realized that the agreement
was inadequate. The problem was that
the limited terms of coverage of the pact
were foreclosing the possibility of par-
ticipation by other carriers.
The non-pact competitors were under
no obligation to pay over to a struck
carrier any windfall payments. Several of
Eastern's direct competitors — Delta,
Northeast, and National — were not in
the pact; United's competitor. Western,
was a non-participant; and Pan Ameri-
can's competitors. Northwest and Braniff,
were both outside the agreement. Con-
sequently, these lines in particular began
to agitate for an expansion of member-
ship. Eastem, in fact, threatened to pull
out of the original pact unless its com-
petitors could be induced to join.^s
The essential reason why the other
seven trunk-lines abstained from joining
was due to the nature of the coverage
conditions of the original pact. The non-
'""Joint Exhibits...," vol. I., Appendix to
Joint Exhibit 1, p. 22.
participants were all the smaller firms in
the industry. These carriers believed that
the agreement would not benefit them,
since a condition for the receipt of pay-
ments was that a strike be called follow-
ing the issuance of recommendations by
a presidential emergency board. The
smaller carriers doubted that such a
Board would be convened if they were
struck. Their position was reinforced by
the Eisenhower Administration's alleged
"policy at that time not to appoint
Boards except where a strike would shut
down one of the few largest carriers."^*
The Amendment of March 22, 1960
To remedy the coverage restraint
which was serving to limit the participa-
tion rate, the carriers on March 22, 1960
filed an amendment which added a
fourth criterion that would make a mem-
ber carrier eligible for payments. Cover-
age of the pact was broadened to include
a strike "which has been called in the
absence of the establishment of such a
board [i.e., a presidential emergency
board] and the struck party has in all
respects acted in compliance with the
Railway Labor Act."*^
The immediate effect of the new cover-
age provision was just as the original pact
members had hoped. On the same day
that the amendment was filed with the
CAB, BranifF, National, and Northwest
officially notified the CAB that they had
joined. Shortly afterward, on April 7,
1960, Continental also gave official notice
of its membership.
The over-all effect of the amendment,
^""Brief of the Carrier...to Examiner...," p.
11. Their view stemmed from a dispute in which
the administration declined to appoint an emer-
gency board to study a threatened strike involv-
ing Western Airlines and ALPA. A strike of 108
days ensued.
"'"Initial Decision.. .Examiner...," Appendix
D, p. 139.
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however, was not merely to provide
coverage for smaller firms which would
not normally warrant the convening of
an emergency hoard. It also meant that
any "lawful" or "unlawful" strike against
a carrier would bring the pact into opera-
tion.
Soon after the new coverage amend-
ment was passed, the pact members found
that the agreement was still not complete-
ly satisfactory. The objections were var-
ied but they all came to the same con-
clusion: the windfall payments were not
providing adequate protection due to
financial and calculative limitations.
One of the problems came to light
when Continental sustained a small strike
which caused it to reduce its service, but
for the most part did not affect its flight
schedule. Continental requested, none-
theless, that its four competitors tender
their windfall payments as required un-
der the pact.38 The competitors—
American, Braniff, Eastern, and Trans
World — replied that they could not
discern a significant increase in their
passenger revenues that could be attrib-
uted to the partial shutdown. Con-
tinental charged that:
It appeared to us that the mechanics of
computing "windfall payments" were
the original and the amended pact were
silent on this issue of whether or not "windfall
payments" were payable in partial shutdowns of
service. In June 1960, a strike of Eastern's pilots
in Miami, Florida, against "inflight inspection"
practices of the Federal Aviation Agency led to
a partial shutdown. The strike was classified as
"unlawful" under the terms of the Railway
Labor Act. The question of the applicability of
the pact to such a situation was sent to arbitra-
tion where, subsequently, the arbitrator held that
the pact did cover such circumstances and that
windfall payments were required from its com-
petitors (see "Joint Exhibits...," vol. II, Joint
Exhibit No. C, p. 7). As an aside, it is of interest
to note that Eastern had threatened to withdraw
from the pact if partial shutdowns were not
included (see "Joint Exhibits...," vol. I, Ap-
pendix 1, p. 69).
such that a carrier our size could easily
establish "windfall payments" for which
it was obligated as a consequence of a
strike on a large carrier, but, on the
other hand, the large carrier could find
it very difficult to identify "windfall pay-
ments" which it had obtained as a result
of a strike on an airline our
Consequently, Continental withdrew
from the pact as of December 31, 1961.
A second source of discontent was
voiced by Pan American, whose com-
plaint stemmed from the fact that most
of its competition was with foreign air-
lines which were not included in the pact.
Thus, Pan American found itself obli-
gated to pay out funds to its few domestic
competitors but seldom receiving funds,
since most of its competitors were other
international carriers. Accordingly, the
airline complained that it was on a "one
way street."^"
The third cause of dissatisfaction was
that several of the domestic carriers' chief
competitors still were not in the pact.
Eastern's competitors —Delta, North-
east, and, as of December 31, 1961,
National*! — were non-pact members.
United's competitor. Western, was also
outside the terms of the agreement.
A fourth insufficiency, which was of a
conjectural nature, gave rise to the con-
cem of some parties. It was quite con-
ceivable that the competitors of a struck
carrier could normally be operating at
full or nearly full capacity at the time of
the strike. Consequently, little, if any,
windfall payments would be forthcom-
ing.
Thus, prompted by these motivations,
the stage was set for another important
amendment.
^Transcript of Hearings before Examiner,
March 1, 1962, vol. 4, pp. 390-391.
"See, "Joint Exhibits...,"vol. I, .'\ppendix to
Joint Exhibit 1, p. 59.
"See below, pp. 11-12.
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The Amendment of March 26, 1962
The carriers had actually begun in-
quiries into possible methods of increas-
ing the benefits at least as far back as
196O.*2 Their efforts culminated on
March 26, 1962 when the members filed
a new amendment to the pact which
guarantees to any struck carrier that it
will receive benefits totaling at least 25
percent of its "normal air transport oper-
ating expense" (called the "standard
amount")** for its operations that are
shut down. To the extent that windfall
payments made by the direct competitors
of a struck carrier fail to meet the stand-
ard amount, additional "supplemental
payments" will be made by all of the pact
members. These payments will be based
upon the proportion between their indi-
vidual "air transport operating revenues"
for the preceding calendar year and the
total air transport revenues for all the
participating carriers. A limitation of
one-half of 1 percent (.5 percent) of "air
transport operating revenue" for the pre-
vious year is established as the maximum
annual liability of such payments by each
carrier. In the event that the liability
limitation is reached before one or more
carriers has received its 25 percent, pro-
vision is made for a proportional redis-
tribution of the supplemental payments
among all of the struck carriers in that
year. On the other hand, if the windfall
payment should equal or exceed the
standard amount, no supplemental pay-
ments will be made and the struck
*="Joint Exhibits...," vol. I, Appendix to
Joint Exhibit 1, p. 39; and also pp. 40-46.
""Normal air transport operating expenses"
for each day for any operation is defined as its
average daily air transport operating expenses
for such operations includable in Accounts 5100-
7000, under the C.A.B.'s Uniform System of Ac-
counts and Reports, for twelve months of full
operation immediately prior to the month in
which the strike began.
carrier can retain all such excess amounts
over the standard amount.
Under the supplemental payments con-
cept, the initiative rests with the struck
carrier — or receiving carrier — to com-
pute the amount to which it is entitled
beyond the windfall amount. The struck
carrier then notifies the other carriers of
their obligations.
Continental rejoined the pact when
the supplemental payments provision be-
came effective, with the belief that, in the
event of a future strike, it would now be
entitled to payments regardless of the
difficulties it would still encounter with
respect to the windfall payments concept.
In order to close an alleged "loophole,"
an addition to the coverage conditions of
the pact was also made at this time, a
fifth criterion which makes a pact mem-
ber eligible to receive payments in the
event that an emergency board should be
convened but fails to make recommenda-
tions for settlement.
The Computation Memorandum
The Problem
Since the supplemental payment is
actually a residual difference between the
standard amount and the windfall pay-
ment, it is apparent that the most impor-
tant calculative aspect of the pact is the
computation of this payment. Eor this
reason, the computation process involved
in determining the magnitude of the
windfall payment is of major conse-
quence to the operation of the pact.
Eor the first five years of the pact, the
computation was left to each individual
carrier to determine its own method. The
lack of uniformity in procedures was
bound to lead to internal difficulties. The
issue came to a head following a strike
against National in May 1961. The cause
of the dissatisfaction arose "over the man-
ner and methods pursued by Eastern in
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the implementation of their obligation
under the Mutual Aid Pact."** National
believed that Eastern's payment "was
very much less than it should have
been."*5 National was so incensed that it
withdrew from membership in the pact
as of December 31, 1961.
A further stimulus for the establish-
ment of a formal and uniform procedure
was provided in the hearings over the
legality of the pact. The Bureau of Eco-
nomic Regulation of the CAB (the Bur-
eau) — a division of the CAB whose
responsibility in formal hearings is to
represent the public interest in matters
that involve agreements between compet-
ing carriers — recommended the estab-
lishment of a single procedure. The deci-
sion of the Hearing Examiner concurred
with this position.
The Memorandum
Given these pressures, the carriers filed
a memorandum on October 29, 1963, stat-
ing that "all of the carrier parties have
now adopted an identical statement of
procedure for computing payments un-
der the agreement."** In a twelve-page
appendix to the memorandum, an out-
line of a single formula to compute wind-
fall payments was presented.
Without venturing into the lengthy
and specific provisions of the formula,
several of its essential features should be
stated. Eirst, with regard to the computa-
tion of increased revenues by the paying
carrier, five basic steps are involved:
1. Determination of the segments of
the paying carrier that are competitive.
2. Selection of a representative "base
period" [usually the three-week period
prior to the commencement of the strike]
in the interval preceding the strike for
measuring traffic carried by the paying
""Transcript...," p. 422.
'"Ibid.
""Memorandum of the Carrier Parties,"
C.A.B. Docket No. 9977, Oct. 29, 1963, p. 2.
carrier over competitive and noncom-
petitive segments.
3. Measurement of the actual daily
volume of traffic of the paying carrier
over competitive and noncompetitive seg-
ments during the base period and during
the term of the strike.
4. Computation of the excess of traffic
actually carried by the paying carrier
during the period of the strike above the
"normal" traffic volume that it could
reasonably have expected in the absence
of the strike.
5. Conversion of the excess traffic into
increased revenues attributable to the
strike.*'^
Thus, the revenues received during the
strike period by the paying carrier consist
of all revenue generated of non-competi-
tive segments; "normal" revenue gener-
ated over competitive segments; and the
"excess" of actual revenue over "normal"
revenue on competitive segments. It is
this "excess," less applicable direct ex-
penses, which is paid over to the struck
carrier.
In addition to defining all of the key
terms used in the computing process, the
memorandum also indicates many of the
numerous complications associated with
the computation of the "excess" of actual
revenue figure. A few of the prominent
modifications to the single formula —
which serve to indicate the complexity of
the computation task — are as follows:
1. The base period must be adjusted
for seasonal and cyclical variations.
2. An allowance is made for a change
in the competitive segment figure ena-
bling it to be proportional to the change
in the non-competitive segment figure
over the same period — i.e., if the non-
competitive revenues increase by 5 per-
cent for the strike period, then the com-
petitive segment is given an allowance of
a 5 percent increase which is not con-
sidered as a part of the windfall payment.
"Ibid., p. 1 of Appendix A.
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY'S MUTUAL AID PACT 13
3. Adjustments must be made for
changes in the market structure during
the base period or for the strike period—
such as the awarding of new routes to
the paying carrier, the introduction of
new equipment, or the opening of a new
airport.
4. If more than one competing carrier
is struck, then payments to each are made
with regard to the segments on which
they compete in proportion to the traffic
carried by each in the prestrike base
period.
Thus, the formula — while representing
a point of common departure for all of
the participants — still, of necessity, must
leave an element of latitude to each car-
rier to compute its actual windfall pay-
ments.
Having calculated the "excess" revenue
attributable to the strike of a competitor,
the next step is to compute the "added
direct expense" which is to be deducted
from the revenue figure. To ascertain
these costs, it is necessary to establish a
base period (which is the calendar quar-
ter during which the windfall payment
is made) from which the "unit" costs are
determined. The "units" which are meas-
ured fall into the following four cate-
gories:
1. The costs of flying the airplane,
measured by wheel-off to wheel-on hours.
2. The costs of handling the airplane
on the ground, measured by number of
departures.
3. The costs of handling passengers
while in flight, measured by passenger
miles flown.
4. The costs of handling passengers or
cargo on the ground, measured by pas-
sengers carried or cargo tons lifted.*^
In addition to these traffic production
costs, it is necessary to determine the ad-
ditional administrative and general costs
which are incurred by the paying carrier.
"Ibid., p. 6 of Appendix A.
Provision is also made for adjustments
due to special circumstances by the indi-
vidual carrier when and if they should be
necessary.
Challenge to the Legality of the Pact
On April 12, 1960, the six major
unions in the industry and the AATU
filed a long list of objections to the pact
with the CAB. The unions, in their brief,
requested the Board either to disapprove
the amended pact or to conduct a full
evidentiary hearing on the questions it
raised.
Consequently, on June 20, 1960, the
CAB reconsidered its earlier stand and
ordered a thorough investigation. Several
factors contributed to this decision. The
pact had been in operation for eighteen
months and facts concerning its opera-
tion were now available. In addition, the
participation in the pact had been in-
creased to the point where it included
nine of the, then, twelve domestic trunk-
line carriers and a major U. S. interna-
tional carrier. Also the coverage condi-
tions had expanded so as to include
virtually every strike in which a carrier
had complied with the Railway Labor
Act. Thus, holding that conditions had
changed since its original approval, the
CAB decided that "the principle of mu-
tual assistance among air carriers had
emerged as a long-term policy with im-
plication of great impact on labor-man-
agement relations and the public inter-
est."*9
In the lengthy proceedings before the
Hearing Examiner, the union parties
argued that the pact tended to spread
and lengthen strikes, to force the develop-
ment of counterdevices, and to create a
hostile environment for the conduct of
collective bargaining. Eor these reasons,
the unions asserted that the pact tended
'""Initial Decision.. .Examiner...," p. 3.
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to defeat the purposes and intents of the
Railway Labor Act.^ o If true, then the
pact would be harmful to the "public
interest" and, therefore, in violation of
the Eederal Aviation Act. As a result, the
unions asked that the entire pact be
struck down.
The Bureau tended to take a more
middle-of-the-road approach. In essence,
its position was that of approving the
windfall payments but opposing the sup-
plemental payments amendment. Con-
tending that the inclusion of the supple-
mental payments provision would seri-
ously disrupt labor-management "har-
mony and stability" and that it would
force pact members "to choose between a
surrender of corporate sovereignty and a
violation of the Railway Labor Act,"^^
the Bureau of Economic Regulations
charged that "the Pact is no longer a
defensive weapon."^^ The Bureau argued
that, since every pact member is obligated
to pay a portion of the supplemental
benefits due a struck carrier, the members
will be encouraged to take common posi-
tions on major problem issues. Recalci-
trant positions would be, by implication,
frowned upon. Thus, the Bureau con-
tended, impetus would be provided for
unilateral group bargaining, which
would be a violation of the interpretation
given to the Railway Labor Act by the
CAB.
The carriers replied to the above
charges by contending that both the
"In their original approval of the pact, the
CAB held that the pact did not violate specific
sections of the Railway Labor Act. Thus, in all
subsequent proceedings the unions confined their
legal attack to the broader issue concerning a
violation of the "intended purposes" of the act.
"^"Reply Brief of the Bureau of Economic
Regulations to Examiner S. Thomas Simon,"
C.A.B. Docket No. 9977, Jan. 18, 1963, p. 2.
°°"Brief of the Bureau of Economic Regula-
tion to the Board," CA.B. Docket No. 9977, Oct.
10, 1963, p. 7.
windfall payments and the supplemental
payments serve to further the "public
interest," and that the pact encouraged
peaceful settlements by requiring em-
ployer adherence to the procedures of the
Railway Labor Act before they would be
entitled to benefits. Eurther, they con-
tended that the likelihood of frequent
strikes — especially "unlawful" strikes
under the act — is diminished. Since the
unions are aware that most strikes make
the pact operational, the reduced or
"neutralized" economic impact of the
strike weapon should mean less reliance
upon the strike and more incentive for
serious bargaining.'*^
Initial Decision of the Hearing Examiner
On May 14, 1963, Hearing Examiner
S. Thomas Simon rendered his decision,
a decision which rejected virtually all of
the arguments of both the union parties
and the Bureau. In upholding the valid-
ity of the entire pact, Simon concluded
that the agreement was merely another
"economic weapon" which the CAB
should not attempt to regulate because
such action would restrict the ability of
one party to bargain effectively.
In his decision, Simon found that the
primary objective of the pact was "a re-
duction in the number of strikes with the
consequent losses to the Pact members as
a group."^* Reviewing the strike history
of the trunk-line carriers since the incep-
tion of the pact, he found that there had
been only one strike which involved
purely economic issues, stating that the
pact members and non-members "have
been almost continuously involved in
labor disputes which have had their roots
in a jurisdictional representation con-
troversy between two major air transport
°="Brief of the Carrier.. .Examiner...," pp.
36ff.
""Initial Decision.. .Examiner...," p. 97.
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unions representing flight crew mem-
bers."55 He denied the carriers' charge of
an existing "imbalance" of economic
power in favor of the unions and indi-
cated that carriers were not "helpless"
and "could have weathered their labor
difficulties without catastrophic results
in the absence of mutual assistance."^*
Nevertheless, in a statement that seems
partially contradictory, he approved the
pact on the grounds that:
. . . The record developed by the carriers
relating to the financial vulnerability of
a carrier to a strike, as well as the evi-
dence of unrestrained use of strike power
by the unions in the crew complement
controversy, is a justification for the adop-
tion of the mutual assistance principle as
an economic weapon for use in the col-
lective bargaining process.'*'^
Brushing aside the Bureau's contention
that the supplemental payments section
could have dire effects upon labor-man-
agement relations as being "supposition-
al" and as "inchoate inferences," Simon
stated that he was "of the opinion that
the Pact has had little or no recognizable
authority upon the course which labor
relations has taken during this period.''^^
Accordingly, he concluded that "there is
no substantial evidence in the record that
the Pact has had any material effect upon
the collective bargaining process in the
On July 11, 1963, the CAB exercised
its right of discretionary review of the
initial decision of the Examiner.*** The
union parties and the Bureau had both
id., p. 101.
"'Ibid., p. 120.
"Ibid., pp. 120-121.
•"/ftiU, p. 118.
^Ibid., p. 119.
"Under the 1963 amended version of Part
302.28(d) of the CAB's Rutes of Practice in Eco-
nomic Proceedings, the findings of the Examiner
are final, unless there is a formal petition for
review or should two or more Board members on
their own initiative request a review.
filed petitions requesting review; the car-
riers opposed the move.
In their respective briefs to the Board,
the positions of the parties remained
essentially the same as before. The car-
riers laid stronger emphasis upon the
jurisdictional difficulties in the industry
than they had previously. The union
parties again sought a total condemna-
tion of the plan. The Bureau requested
only to have the supplemental payments
provision struck from the pact.
The Decision of the CAB
On July 10, 1964, the CAB issued its
decision on the legality of the pact. Three
members granted approval, but their
decision was not finally dispositive. A
three-year trial period — until July 10,
1967 — was established. At that time, a
final decision will be rendered.
The majority expressed complete
agreement with the decision of the Exam-
iner that the pact is consistent with the
"public interest" provisions of the Eeder-
al Aviation Act.^i Moreover, they stated:
Air carriers are particularly vulnerable
to strikes, and the industry has, in the
recent f)ast, been plagued by strikes. The
Pact offers, at a not unreasonable cost for
the protection obtained, a substantial
measure of relief against the costs of
strikes, in this fashion and to this extent
contributing to industrial stability.*^
Nonetheless, the majority was hesitant
to state without reservation that the pact
has not had some contributory effect to
the general "deterioration of labor-man-
agement relations" during the recent
years. Eor this reason, the time limitation
to their approval was included.*^
One member of the Board concurred
in part with the majority and dissented
"^''Opinion of the Board," CA.B. Docket No.
9977, Order E-21044, July 10, 1964, p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 5.
'"Ibid., p. 8.
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in part. Agreeing with the Bureau, he The important thing is that the Pact
approved the part of the pact concerned has created and nurtured a spirit of dis-
with windfall payments, hut opposed the trust that is destructive of the mutual
, ^ ' . .'^  .,, confidence and respect which is essentiai
supplemental payments provision. Fear- ^^ ^ ^^ successful negotiation and solution
ing that the latter provision would en- of problems in the emotionally charged
courage "involuntary joint bargaining" atmosphere of labor-management rela-
under "the guise of single carrier negotia- tions.^ ^
tion" and that it will encourage the un- EfiEectiveness of the Pact in Meeting
ions to develop counterbalancing ma- Carrier Objectives
chinery, he vigorously disapproved of
. " , • , , . , . , A comparison of the total windfall
Another member dissented entirely '^  , . -.c M • r i_
, , . . . , . . _ ^ payments and windrall receipts of thefrom the opinion of the maiority. Tust as * . . . . , , ' ,
, , - ^ , . , . . 1 . . r participating carriers through December
he had voted in the original opinion of o, ,«j^_ . ° j • n? 11 , rr-u
, „ , . , -„„ , ° . , . ^ J 31, 1962 IS presented m Table I. The
the Board in 1959, he again disapproved ui • J - *u l • ^ c
. . . . ...i, ^ ,. . table indicates the actual magnitude of
of the pact in its entirety. ''^ Indicating , . jr ,, • r ,_
/ . ' , ,, the windfall payments portion of the
that there is common agreement by all ^ .. ^ T OOO li- • -^ c
. , „ , , , , , • pact, totaliner over $22 million m its first
members of the Board that labor relations ^c u T-U ui l u u
, , , . , . , , fifty months. The table also shows the
had deteriorated in recent years, he stated u J u r u u u
, ., . , breadth of the gap between the payments
that It IS apparent that the unions regard , , • <• • T.
^ ^ -. , _^ ^ , " and the receipts of some carriers. Pan
the pact as a direct attack. Hence he con- . . j T T • J • J e
/^ American and United paid out far more
\ than they received; Eastern and North-
"ibid., p. 2 (o£ opinion by Vice-chairman west have had the reverse experience.
Murphy).
^Ibid., p. 1 (of opinion by Member Minetti). ""Ibid., p. 4.
Tabte 1. Summary of "Windfall Payments" under Mutual Aid Pact,
October 1958-December 31, 1962.
(thousands of dollars)
Received Totat Amount Paid by
by Received
AAL BAL CAP CAL EAL NAL NWA PAA TWA UAL
(7) (2) {3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (5) (P) (10) (11) {12)
American S 4,431 $ — $169 $ 353 $41 $ — $ — $ — $ — $1,260 $2 ,608
Branifi — — —
Capital 2,620 908 — — — 301 — — — 419 992
Continental... — — — — — — — — — — —
Eastern 8,278 1,367 184 714 2 — 411 424 1,351 352 3,474
National 107 4 1 26 — 74 — — — 1 1
Northwest 3,601 177 — 796 — 115 — — 650 43 1,820
Pan American. 121 — 7 — — — — — — — 114
Trans World.. 3,071 727 25 195 44 1 — — 319 — 1,760
United — — — — — — — — — — —
Total Paid.. $22,229 $3,183 $386 $2,084 $87 $491 $411 $424 $2,320 $2,075 $10,769
Source: "Initial Decision of Hearing Examiner," CA.B. Docket No. 9977, May 14, 1963, Appendix
G, p. 150 and Appendix H, p. 151.
•Payment was less than $500.
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Thus, it is clear why Pan American
sought the adoption of the supplemental
payments amendment and, as will be dis-
cussed below, why United became a
strong critic of the labor relations policies
of its fellow pact members.
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the total
supplemental payments paid out and
received since the introduction of the
concept. It has been used only once — in
the June 1962 strike against Eastern by
the Flight Engineers. In that case. Eastern
Table 2. Summary of "Supplemental Pay-
ments" Under Mutual Aid, October
1963.
(thousands of dollars)
Carrier Amount Amount
Paid Received
American $1,061 $ —
Braniff 118 —
Continentcil — —
Eastern — 6,069
Northwest 308 —
Pan American 1,023 —
Trans World 169 —
United 3,390 —
Total $6,069 $6,069
Source: "Initial Decision of Hearing Examin-
er," CAJS. Dockett No. 9977, May 14, 1963,
Appendix H, p. 151; there were no "supple-
mental payments" made between May 1963 and
October 1964.
received $16,014,517 in total mutual aid
with $9,945,307 representing windfall
payments and $6,069,210 representing
supplemental payments.
Participation and Coverage
Currently four of the existing eleven
trunk-line carriers remain outside the
pact; Delta, Northeast, and Western have
never shown any interest in joining the
agreement, and National, the largest of
the non-participants, became embittered
as a pact member and withdrew. Due to
a provision contained in the amended
pact of March 26, 1962, National cannot
rejoin the pact without making the net
payments to the pact members that it
would have owed had it not withdrawn.
Consequently, it would appear unlikely
that any of the four will join the pact in
the foreseeable future. As a result, the
effectiveness of the windfall payments
will be diminished to the degree that
would-be passengers of a struck carrier
decide to use the facilities of the available
non-participants. The effect of non-par-
ticipants reducing the windfall payments
is now, however, somewhat offset by the
operation of the supplemental payments
amendment.
The amended pact is currently appli-
cable to virtually every strike situation.
Only two strike circumstances would ap-
pear not to be covered: (1) if a carrier
member violates the terms of the Railway
Labor Act; (2) if union demands are
equal to or less than the recommenda-
tions of a duly convened emergency
board and the carrier refuses to accept
the union's demand.
The supplemental payments concept
now assumes that every participant can
recoup at least 25 percent of its "normal"
air transport expense for the operations
that are shut down during a strike.
Should the windfall exceed this 25 per-
cent figure, the struck line would receive
the additional amount. Hence, whether
a struck pact member should find one or
more of his direct competitors — domes-
tic or foreign — to be non-participants is
no longer of paramount importance.
Each struck member is guaranteed the
standard amount. While those lines that
still find several of their direct competi-
tors outside the pact may envy those
carriers which can recoup an amount
that exceeds the standard amount, the
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supplemental payments provision seems
to have ameliorated this complaint.
Liabilities and the "In and Out" Problem
The amended pact does mean that all
members assume a financial obligation
whenever a fellow member is struck. As
a result, the likelihood of increased inter-
est among, the members over the varying
labor policies and bargaining atmos-
pheres of the members is far greater than
would be the case in the absence of the
pact. Such mutual concern may well be
the source of heated controversy in the
future. One such instance has already
occurred. United Airlines became upset
over the fact that other airlines were ex-
periencing strikes over the ALPA-FEIA
controversy, an issue that it had peace-
fully resolved. United, having contribu-
ted the most into the pact, threatened in
April 1965 to withdraw if strikes on this
same issue continued on other lines.*'' As
the date for notification of actual intent
to withdraw approached (November 1,
1963), it became apparent that United
had reconsidered its position. Instrumen-
tal in this reconsideration undoubtedly,
was the fact that United became a party
to a major unresolved dispute with IAM
which, on October 9,1963, resulted in the
establishment of a presidential emer-
gency board.88
Membership in the pact has been in
the past a source of frequent problems.
Eastern (twice). Pan American, and Unit-
ed have at various times threatened to
leave the pact; Continental withdrew
only to rejoin three months later; and
National pulled out entirely. In order to
""United Air Head Opposes Mutual Aid Strike
Plan," Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1963, p. 8;
see also "Patterson Favors U.A.L. Withdrawal
from Strike Pact," Aviation Daily, vol. 145, April
29, 1963, p. 371.
°*The dispute was subsequently settled without
a strike on Dec. 18, 1963.
Stabilize the participation in the pact and
to prevent a carrier from joining the pact
when it was advantageous and leaving
when it appeared to be detrimental, a
section pertinent to this subject was in-
cluded in the amendments of March
1962. Withdrawal from the pact is per-
mitted from year to year as of December
31, with sixty days' prior notice. But the
withdrawing carrier will remain liable
for all payments under agreement for a
period of one year thereafter. As to join-
ing the pact, six months prior notice is
required of any applicant who has not
been a member before. As for a carrier
who was once a member and seeks read-
mittance, the carrier can rejoin only by
making the net payments that it would
have been required to make had it not
withdrawn.
Conclusions
The approval of the pact by the CAB
will not significantly alter the industrial
relations environment in the industry.
The true source of the turmoil of recent
years has sprung from a commingling of
several forces. The pact itself assumes
importance not as a cause but, rather, as
a result of these disruptive factors. The
most dominant of these considerations is
the presence of multiple unionism and of
rival unionism. The perpetuation of such
labor market characteristics can only
mean that bitter union competition and
extensive industry strike exposure will
continue.
The pact itself is not going to increase
the incidence of strikes. The benefits re-
ceived from it are in no way competitive
with the gains to be realized fom con-
tinued operation. The true significance of
the pact will be revealed only after a
strike has begun. When shutdowns do
occur, they may tend to last longer and
to be more bitter than would be the case
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if there were no pact. The Bureau has
contended that it is the supplemental
payments feature of the pact that will
cause these undesirable results. Actually,
it would seem that both the windfall pay-
ments and the supplemental payments
would have similar effects.
It is doubtful that deletion of the sup-
plemental payments would materially
alter the attitude of a union facing a
strike with a pact member who must rely
solely upon windfall payments. Similarly,
whether a strike will be longer as a result
of the carrier receiving hoth supple-
mental payments and windfall payments
would depend entirely upon the particu-
lar carrier involved. It may be that
the windfall payments could exceed the
standard amount, in which case the sup-
plemental payments would not even be
involved. Gonversely, it could be that all
of the revenue received by a member car-
ier — like Gontinental — might be en-
tirely made up of supplemental pay-
ments. What, then, is the difference in the
outcome of the two situations? It is not
the type of payment that is crucial to the
determination of union attitudes or the
length of strikes but, rather, the presence
of the payments themselves, regardless of
their derivation, that affects such matters.
Yet the acceptance of free collective bar-
gaining as the desired method of resolv-
ing industrial disputes in our nation is
premised upon the use of such private
economic weapons.^ ^ The establishment
of such weaponry in other industries and
the periodic exercise of these devices in
many bargaining situations are funda-
mental to our system of resolving indus-
trial conflicts.
The most important criticism of the
""See Committee for Economic Development,
The Public Interest in National Labor Policy
(New York: Committee for Economic Develop-
ment, 1961), pp. 135-136.
Bureau and of Vice-chairman Murphy in
their attack upon the supplemental pay-
ments concept centered upon the possi-
bility of a violation of the Railway Labor
Act. Unilateral establishment of multi-
unit bargaining is not, however, explicit-
ly prohibited by the act. Nowhere in the
act is there mention of multiunit bar-
gaining. The prohibition stems directly
from an administrative interpretation
given to the act by the GAB. The opinion
of the GAB is based upon the allegation
that such bargaining could lead to indus-
try-wide shutdowns which would violate
the "public interest" section of the Eed-
eral Aviation Act which the GAB is
directed to protect. Such a position does
not seem tenable. If both the unions and
the carriers voluntarily agree to bargain
on an industry-wide basis, it would be
quite legal under the interpretation given
to the act. How can the GAB, then, claim
that it is against the "public interest" if
the parties are indirectly led to industry-
wide bargaining, but that it is acceptable
if they voluntarily agree to such a devel-
opment? The potentiality for a shutdown
of the entire industry is the same in
either case.
In many industries, multiunit bargain-
ing has proven quite successful. In the
airline industry, its evolution has been
virtually stymied. As a result, the indi-
vidual carriers have regularly experi-
enced a host of threatened and actual
strikes on similar issues. As long as both
parties must agree before multiunit bar-
gaining can be introduced, many of the
aforementioned negative factors that
have given rise to the Mutual Aid Pact
are going to continue to disrupt indus-
trial relations in the industry.
With reference to the contention that
the supplemental payments provision
will encourage pact members to seek
similar solutions to common problems.
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it is logical to conclude that the pact does
provide impetus for such a development.
It does not follow, however, that the pact
itself provides channels that actually
make the achievement of common posi-
tions more likely to occur than would be
possible in the absence of the agreement.
There is no way that one or more pact
members can directly infiuence the labor
policies of another carrier except by
threatening to withdraw, which would
render the issue a moot point.
The pact has several features that are
quite desirable for a private bargaining
system: membership is open to all trunk-
line carriers; every facet of the pact is
available for public inspection at the
offices of the CAB in Washington; all
payments and receipts under it must be
reported. The administration of the
agreement is handled entirely by each
individual carrier and does not require
any select group possessing arbitrary
powers over the actions of the members.
In short, it seems that in this particular
industry, the pact is but an outward man-
ifestation of an extremely unstable and
insecure labor relations foundation. The
public interest could be better served if
more attention was directed toward the
causes of strikes in this industry rather
than the reactions to them.

